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Introduction
At the end of 2011 and in the beginning of 2012 the White House 
announced a U.S. strategic pivot towards the Asia-Pacific region in order 
to ensure, as it was expressed by president Barack Obama in his address 
to Australian Parliament, that “the United States will play a  larger and 
long-term role in shaping this region and its future”. Some signs of change 
in this respect could have been perceived earlier. Actually, already in 2009 
careful observers of U.S. foreign and security policy could have noticed 
the  first signals of Washington’s increasing focus on Asia. Just then, 
in 2009, Barack Obama announced a  new policy direction that would 
henceforth hinge on a “tilt to the East”. Moreover, the first foreign visit 
of the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was to Asian countries, which 
was untypical as in the past, newly-appointed Secretaries of State almost 
always used to choose a European country as a destination for their first 
foreign visit.
It appears prudent to assume that currently a salient transformation 
in U.S. foreign and security policy is materializing. What needs to be em-
phasized are the military and security aspects of this shift. Four military 
and security aspects of the U.S. pivot to Asia need to be distinguished:
− the rebalance and redeployment of U.S. forces in the West Pacific 
and East Asia region;
− the creation of the Air-Sea Battle Concept with a view to potential 
conflict with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA);
− the growing counteracting against China’s espionage, particularly 
cyber espionage;
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− intensification of bilateral and multilateral military and security 
cooperation between the U.S. and its partners in the Asia-Pacific, includ-
ing an increase in diplomatic support for East Asian states being in mari-
time territorial disputes with China.
The author decided to arrange the article according to the four aspects 
of the U.S. pivot to Asia, as mentioned above. Content analysis together 
with general logical methods (deduction, induction) have been employed 
during the research on the matters raised in the article. This study is an 
attempt to answer two basic research questions: what the U.S. pivot to 
Asia means in practice in regards to the U.S. military security policy and 
how Beijing perceives the U.S. pivot to Asia.
The Rebalance and Redeployment of U.S. Forces 
to the Asia-Pacific
The navy is the core of the U.S. military rebalance to Asia. The Chief 
of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert, enumerated four prin-
cipal directions of the U.S. Navy’s shift to Asia: deployment of more mil-
itary assets to Asia and the Western Pacific, basing more units and forces 
in this part of the world, gaining new military capabilities in the face of 
specific demands within the Asia-Pacific theater of war and, last but not 
least, intensifying partnerships and cooperation with U.S. allies in the re-
gion (Greenert, 2012). As apart of the  pivot to Asia, the  White House 
took steps to gain rights to the deployment of U.S. warships and aircraft 
in new bases in the Asia-Pacific region. In August 2013, the Philippines 
and the U.S. commenced talks on increasing the U.S. military presence 
in the Philippine archipelago. In spite of the fact that details of the ne-
gotiations have not been made public, it is known that the  Philippine 
government plans to allow U.S. and Japanese warships to station in mari-
time bases situated on Philippine territory. Supposedly, American soldiers 
may return to the Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, which had 
been used by the U.S. military during the Cold War and which the U.S. 
soldiers had to leave in the 1990s due to social protests. Interestingly, 
this time protests against the revival of an American military presence in 
the archipelago also came about. Maybe they were inspired by the PRC’s 
intelligence, however there is no firm evidence supporting this thesis All 
the states that have maritime territorial disputes with China are searching 
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for U.S. support. It is especially important for the Philippinesas they have 
small, underfinanced, backward and obsolete army, navy and air forces 
that could not by any means settle any dispute with China in Manila’s 
favour. At Manila’s request, U.S. maritime patrol P-3 Orion aircraft regu-
larly patrol over the disputed Spratly islands and nearby waters. Accord-
ing to American press, the President of the Philippines, Benigno Aquino, 
requested these patrols form the White House in 2012. Washington an-
swered positively in regards to this request. Since February 2013, P-3s 
conduct patrol missions over Ayungin Reef as well, which is situated 106 
nautical miles from Palawan Island. Reportedly P-3s are based at Clark Air 
Base, which suggests that the U.S. forces had moved there secretly before 
the recent talks had even begun. The Philippine ambassador to the U.S., 
Jose Cuisia, publicly expressed his view that U.S. military support for his 
motherland is aimed at preventing potential aggression against the Phil-
ippines. Though the word “China” was not spoken in this context, no 
one has any doubt that the Philippine ambassador had China in his mind 
as the potential aggressor (Henzel, 2013). Perhaps the most telling sign 
of U.S. redeployment of forces to the West Pacific are the plans to begin 
a permanent military presence in Australia. During his visit to Australia 
in November 2011, President Barack Obama announced that a deal be-
tween the U.S. and Australian governments had concluded. The accord 
will probably lead to an increase in U.S. naval operations off the Austral-
ian coasts on its own and in cooperation with the Royal Australian Navy. 
The expanded U.S. military presence in Australia can and should be inter-
preted as a demonstration both to China and to U.S. allies in the region 
that the global superpower is committed to the security of its East Asian 
allies and treats the growing military power of China very seriously. Dur-
ing the mentioned visit to Australia, the U.S. president announced that 
for the beginning 250 U.S. Marines will rotationally station in Darwin, 
Northern Australia, with ultimately 2500 soldiers stationed there. Due 
to the fact that this is relatively calm part of the world, this announce-
ment has been commonly interpreted as a step against the PRC. However, 
the significance of Obama’s declaration by no means should be exagger-
ated. Currently there are approximately 40,000 U.S. soldiers station in 
Japan and 28,500 in the Republic of Korea (Kruczkowska, 2011: 15). In 
comparison to these numbers, plans for the redeployment of 2500 Ma-
rines is more symbolic than a real threat to China. In addition, the U.S. 
Navy pledged to assign 60% of its warships to the Pacific Fleet by 2020, 
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compared with the approximately 50% at present. The Pentagon wants to 
maximize the interoperability of U.S. Armed Forces with its East Asian 
counterparts. The U.S. military pursues to develop integrated intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance with Japanese, South Korean and Aus-
tralian armed forces, in particular with their navies and air forces. Even 
more significant are the White House’s plans for a considerable expansion 
of missile defense systems in East Asia. The Pentagon intends to build 
up two early-warning X-band missile defense radars. One of these radars 
will be situated in SouthernJapan and the second radar will be mostlikely 
situated in the Philippines or, if the Philippine government does not agree 
the installation of X-band radar on its territory, in some other Southeast 
Asian state. Officially, these plans are aimed at containing threats com-
ing from North Korean ballistic missiles. Unofficially, these facilities will 
also be useful for a Taiwan contingency or other military conflict with 
the Middle Kingdom. As Steven Hildreth, a pundit with the Congression-
al Research Service, accurately put it: The focus of our rhetoric is North 
Korea. The reality is that we're also looking longer term at the elephant in 
the room, which is China (Entous and Barnes, 2012). It must be empha-
sized that one early-warning radar has already been built up in the Ao-
mori Prefecture in northern Japan, so if the Pentagon’s plans were to be 
followed through, the U.S. will have in total three land-based missile-de-
fense radars in East Asia. The government of the PRC firmly objected to 
the installation of the first X-Band radar in northern Japan, so it seems 
rational to conclude that it will staunchly oppose the build-up of a sec-
ond and third radar system as well. Although the U.S. State Department 
repeatedly assured that the  East Asian missile defense is not directed 
against China, Beijing simply does not believe these claims as it is quite 
distrustful toward the  U.S. and its intentions. Such claims are treated 
in China as nothing more than diplomatic eyewash. Therefore, the Pen-
tagon’s plans have an adverse effect in the form of further antagonizing 
of Beijing. On its part, Chinese generals fear that thanks to the new ear-
ly-warning radars the U.S. forces could easily repel any missile strike com-
ing from China, thereby almost completely neutralizing their deterrent 
potential. Beijing does not squander any opportunity for criticizing any 
U.S. policy that works towards the containment of China. For example, 
during the multinational drills code-named Cobra Gold 2012 that took 
place in January 2012, the PRC government resolutely criticized them, 
calling them anti-Chinese. Beijing perceives these and similar exercises 
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unambiguously as directed at China’s containment and as unfriend-
ly. Senior Colonel Li Daguang clearly expressed what the PLA thinks of 
the drills: [Washington’s] effort through the maneuvers is aimed at uni-
fying countries [in the region] around itself [which] runs counter to Chi-
na’s interests in the long term (‘Beijing Calls War Game a Threat’, 2012).
Washington also announced that a special radar earmarked for track-
ing Chinese polar-orbiting satellites, till now situated in the Caribbean 
island of Antigua, will be moved to Western Australia from 2014. From 
there it could begin tracking Chinese polar-orbiting satellites sooner and 
in a much more effective and reliable manner that it could while stationed 
in Antigua. This radar will not be the only U.S. reconnaissance installa-
tion deployed in Western Australia and directed at containing the PRC. 
The U.S. Air Force is going to deploy a new model of a very advanced and 
technically sophisticated satellite-watching telescope in a  yet unknown 
location in Western Australia. The crucial task of this telescope will be 
to monitor geostationary satellites orbiting over the  Indian Ocean and 
Western Pacific. However, this telescope could monitor the  satellites of 
many states, which includes those of India, Pakistan and Iran. However, 
no one doubts that tracking and observing China’s satellites is the cru-
cial task of this device (Perett, 2013). Though the Australian government 
highlights the civilian advantages of having the abovementioned instal-
lations on its territory, mainly the capability to monitor so-called space 
debris, the decision to deploy these facilities on Australian soil is a sign 
of the tightening military ties between Australia and the United States. 
Whatever and however U.S. and Australian diplomats would deny it, both 
states have a common interest in containing China. By deploying these 
important installations in Australia, the White House intends to cement 
bilateral U.S.-Australian security bonds. This action is also a  response 
to the increasing space activities of China, which is manifested in many 
ways and manners. Many East Asian countries are afraid of the  grow-
ing military capabilities of Chinaand are increasingly worried that U.S. 
security guarantees for them could weaken or even completely erode in 
the face of incoming and inevitable cuts in the U.S. defense budget. There 
deployment of U.S. forces together with the intensification of U.S. mili-
tary drills in the region are aimed at calming down U.S. allies. Obama in-
tends to reassure Tokyo, Manila, Canberra, Seoul and other allied capital’s 
that they there are still under the American security umbrella and that 
their bilateral alliances with the world hegemony still stand on the firm 
Przemysław Furgacz 112
ground. The  then U.S. defense attaché in Australia, General McOwan, 
remarked that by  intensifying U.S. naval operations in Western Pacific 
waters Washington sends a clear message to Beijing that the U.S. is fully 
committed to defending regional trade routes against any possible inter-
diction or disturbance (Barnes, 2011). Becoming a part of Obama’s pivot 
to Asia in 2013, the Department of Defense began a gradual deployment 
process of additional air force squadrons to air force bases situated with-
in striking range of the Mainland China. The Pentagon intends to have 
squadrons equipped with all three stealth airplanes revealed to the public, 
that is the F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II as well as the B-2 Spirit stra-
tegic bomber, near the territory of its principal rival to hegemony in East 
Asia. Some of the planes, especially the B-2s, are to station in the West-
ern Pacific only rotationally. The primary base, which will be beefed up, 
is Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. Additionally, three attack subma-
rines have been deployed to Guam Naval Base. Former Defense Secretary 
Leon Panetta declared that the F-22s will also be stationing rotationally on 
U.S. bases in Japan. Similarly, according to Panetta’s claims, newly com-
missioned F-35s are to be deployed to Iwakuni Air Force Base in Japan, 
though in 2017 at the earliest. Moreover, the U.S. Air Force Command 
wants to deploy not only strike aircraft in the Western Pacific, but also 
support aircraft, that is KC-46 air tankers and P-8 Orion anti-submarine 
warfare and patrol aircraft. Both planes could be included in the newest 
equipment in possession of the U.S. Air Force (Axe, 2013). On top of that, 
six destroyers from the Rota U.S. Naval Base in southern Spain are to be 
rotationally moved to the Asia-Pacific as well as three amphibious ships 
that previously used to sail on African and South American bodies of wa-
ter (Greenert, 2012). Nonetheless, the  recent considerable cuts in U.S. 
defense spending may stall the U.S. rebalance to Asia. Despite assurances 
by  the Obama administration that the  cuts in the U.S. defense budget 
will not be little American commitment to the security of its Asia-Pacific 
allies, many analysts from both sides of the Pacific Ocean, more or less 
doubt it. Some East Asian politicians and military personnel have ex-
pressed concern about the U.S. defense cuts (Hayashi and Barta, 2013). 
As a matter of fact, the Pentagon constantly assures that East Asia will 
continue to get priority over other regions, though it is difficult to take 
these assurances for granted in the light of continuous U.S. fiscal prob-
lems as well as the intensifying and escalating war in Syria. These two fac-
tors may substantially influence the U.S. pivot to Asia. The Department 
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of Defense may be forced to resign from some of its more ambitious 
Asia-Pacific plans due to lacking financial resources. This of course would 
be welcomed in China.
The Air-Sea Battle Concept
As two American military experts expressed it: China is the Volde-
mort of U.S. military planning (Yoshihara and Holmes, 2012). By  this 
expression, they meant that the U.S. leaders, military personnel and strat-
egists perceive the Middle Kingdom as the main potential rival of their 
motherland, as a state with which a military clash in the future, in spite 
of being unlikely, is not unimaginable. In order to prepare for a possible 
future armed conflict with the  PRC, the  U.S. military has worked out 
a new concept of pursuing war, which has been named the Air-Sea Battle 
Concept. The Department of Defense fears that the growing potential and 
capabilities of China’s military could in the not so distant future counter-
balance the U.S. military might. In the last two-three years, the Air-Sea 
Battle Concept has become a priority in the Pentagon. The Air-Sea Battle 
doctrine focuses primarily on devising an effective and credible strategy 
to defeat the anti-access/area-denial (known also under the abbreviation 
A2/AD) capabilities achieved by  some, not necessarily friendly toward 
the U.S., states; first and foremost is China and to a  lesser degree Iran 
and North Korea. Beijing has been spending a  lot of money and effort 
on designing, developing and deploying such weapon systems that could 
make the combined U.S. naval and air operations near the coasts of China 
and Taiwan extremely risky or even entirely impossible for U.S. warships 
and airplanes. That is why the Air-Sea Battle Concept is being created. 
For years the Pentagon assumed that U.S. troops in the Asia-Pacific would 
be able to operate from relatively safe bases and carriers. In the light of 
more and more capable Chinese offensive weapons, this assumption is no 
longer justified and the Department of Defense has come to realize that. 
American war games proved that even the U.S. technological superiority 
could not be enough to defeat the PLA in a conflict scenario involving Tai-
wan, if one takes into consideration the quantitative advantage of China 
and extremely long American sea lines of communication to the theatre of 
war. Recent studies have pointed out that projecting naval and air power 
against a formidable and capable enemy operating from continental bases 
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in the immediate vicinity of a theatre of war (such as Mainland China) 
may be extraordinarily difficult and do not guarantee a success (Haddick, 
2011). In other words, the  increasingly capable military force of China 
could challenge U.S. naval dominance not only in the East China and 
South China Seas, but also in the Western Pacific.
The  U.S. Department of Defense has been developing the  Air-Sea 
Battle Concept as a  doctrinal response to the  A2/AD strategy adopted 
by the PLA. The absolutely key characteristic of the concept mentioned 
above is a strict coordination of the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force efforts, 
actions and capabilities. The Department of Defense set up a special in-
stitution, an Air-Sea Strategy Office, with a task to work on the problem of 
how to defeat the PLA if a war scenario materializes (‘U.S. Military Strat-
egy in the Western Pacific’, 2012). Experts of the Air-Sea Strategy Office 
came to the conclusion that in order to retain a military advantage over 
the PLA the U.S. military must, among other things, put an emphasis 
on developing advanced capabilities in undersea warfare. The  substan-
tial technological backwardness of the People’s Liberation Army Navy in 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) is perceived by the U.S. Navy Command 
as a weak point, which must be taken advantage of during possible con-
flict. Replacing the obsolete Los Angeles-class submarines and P-3 Orion 
maritime patrol aircraft with the newly commissioned and advanced Vir-
ginia-class submarines and P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft respec-
tively is a part of Air-Sea Battle (Greenert, 2012). The U.S. Navy plans to 
improve the capabilities of their capabilities in shooting down advanced 
anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-ship ballistic missiles. United States. 
engineers are working hard on producing new better electronic warfare 
systems. Keeping in mind a possible conflict with the PLA Navy, the U.S. 
is developing and constructing the  Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LR-
ASM). The American government hopes that this very advanced missile 
will be better in every respect than its Chinese equivalents. Above all, 
the LRASM is to have much longer range (Henski, 2012: 72–74).
Chinese Espionage Activities in the United States
The White House is increasingly angry at the miscellaneous espionage 
activities of China that are directed at U.S. corporations as well as mili-
tary and government institutions. The problem these espionage activites 
115 The Military and Security Aspects of Obama’s Pivot to Asia
against the U.S. has gradually become one of the most relevant issues in 
their bilateral relations. The Obama administration do not squander any 
occasion to protest against the  intensive spying operations on America 
by Beijing. Although the most famous espionage scandal in recent years 
involved a  Russian spy network in the  U.S., that does not mean that 
the espionage activities conducted by the PRC is less intensive or less dan-
gerous for U.S. interests. Cases regarding Chinese spies caught red-handed 
are maybe less spectacular; however, from the point of view of Washington 
they are by no means less threatening. Much of the Chinese spying ac-
tivity in the U.S. is directed at collecting technologies, data, information, 
designs and trade secrets that could support the military modernization 
of the PRC. This, in turn, is a direct and major threat to U.S. national se-
curity. Noshir Gowadia, Chi Tong Kuok, Xian Hongwei, Li Li, Yang Bing, 
Zhang Zhangwei, Zhang Mingsuan are some of the Chinese spies that 
had been detected and arrested on U.S. territory in recent years. Some of 
them caused irreparable damages to U.S. military security, proving how 
dangerous an opponent the intelligence sector of the PRC is for the FBI. 
Particularly, the online attacks that have occurred since Barack Obama be-
came the President have gradually become a serious irritant in U.S.-China 
relations. Not only has the U.S. government charged China with carrying 
out numerous cyber-attacks, but also Beijing accuses the U.S. intelligence 
services of committing basically the same activities. The case of the now 
famous whistleblower Edward Snowden proves that the accusations made 
by Beijing regarding U.S. Internet spying are not without reason. Wash-
ington repeatedly accuses the  intelligence agencies of China as being 
the most active and persistent global perpetrators of industrial espionage. 
In 2011 a special report regarding this issue was released by the U.S. in-
telligence community. In the above-mentioned report the PRC together 
with the Russian Federation was identified as the most aggressive collec-
tors of American data, information and technologies (Gorman, 2011). Ac-
cording to some U.S. counterintelligence officers, the problem of Chinese 
espionage in the U.S. during the Obama administration has simply got 
out of control. For instance, in March 2011 Chinese hackers conduct-
ed a massive cyber-attack against the U.S. security company RSA. This 
company is known for providing special Internet encryption services for 
its clients, among which are many U.S. corporations. The 2011 report of 
the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that 
as a result of the RSA cyber-intrusion, three other U.S. defense companies 
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had also been targeted by Chinese hackers (Gertz, 2011). Nihil novi sub 
sole onemay say, as U.S. defense contractors regularly report about suc-
cessful or unsuccessful attempts to break into their internal computer 
networks. The  White House vows that the  U.S. intelligence services 
do not conduct state-sponsored hacking forU.S. corporations as the Chi-
nese do  for their own firms. However, in the  light of Snowden revela-
tions, the sincerity of Washington regarding these matters could be easily 
put into question. From the Chinese standpoint, the American protests 
against their cyber spying are nothing more than a clear duplicity. Pressed 
by the harmed U.S. firms, the Obama administration decided to beef up 
its efforts to counter the espionage activities of the PRC in the United 
States. American cyber security experts claim that the most sophisticated, 
complicated and formidable cyber spying operations against U.S. targets 
and interests are carried out by Chinese hackers working for special se-
cret units of the  PLA. The  Chinese intelligence agencies are perceived 
by the U.S. counterintelligence as the most skillful in cyber warfare and 
cyber espionage; therefore, any U.S. actions in the cyber defense sphere 
may be interpreted as an element of the U.S pivot to Asia. Above all, as 
a response to these cases of cyber espionage, the Obama administration 
decided to channel appreciable resources for cyber defense. American cor-
porations are constantly encouraged to install much more sophisticated 
and expensive detection equipment as well as more secure hardware and 
software. Additionally, these firms are also encouraged to intensify their 
cooperation with American counter-intelligence agencies. This year, Pres-
ident Obama signed a special executive order to start creating voluntary 
standards for U.S. corporations to employ methods that will enhance their 
cyber-defense capabilities. Reportedly, the new (mostly classified) cyber in-
telligence policies and strategies are being created. The U.S. Department 
of Defense released its own strategy for defending key American military 
computer networks. One of the elements of this strategy is the develop-
ment of a means to direct U.S. military computer communications into 
a new system just in case of an enemy successfully penetrating American 
military networks on a massive scale (Fifield and Menn, 2011). The de-
tails of this new system haveof course not been made public. The Obama 
administration did not even hesitate to threaten China with diplomatic 
and trade action if corporate espionage involving U.S. firms would not 
be stopped (Gorman and Favole, 2013). In 2011, the U.S. Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense, William J. Lynn, stated that the United States reserves 
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the  right, under the  laws of armed conflict, to respond to serious cyber 
attacks with a proportional and justified military response at the time and 
place of our choosing (Lynn, 2011). This was a  clear signal to China, 
suggesting that it not exaggerate in its unfriendly cyber activities against 
the world superpower. In 2013 the White House released a Strategy to 
Mitigate the Theftof U.S. Trade Secrets. The document enumerates and 
scrupulously describes a multitude of cases of Chinese economic espio-
nage directed at U.S. companies, including prominent Pentagon contrac-
tors. The authors of this document named China a persistent collector of 
U.S. trade secrets.
Cooperation with Asia-Pacific Allies
Intersecting territorial claims in the East and South China Seas have 
become a second issue, after Taiwan, that could potentially lead to a mili-
tary confrontation between the U.S. and China. Acting calmly was one of 
the hints that Deng Xiaoping gave to his political successors. Indeed, Chi-
nese foreign policy was quite calm and careful over the last 25 years. Nev-
ertheless, after 2010 it seems that something has changed in this matter. 
The most conspicuous aspect of the change in Chinese rhetoric and policy 
is an increasingly aggressive or even belligerent stance towards territorial 
disputes in the East and South China Seas. During a meeting between 
the U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and his Chinese counterpart 
Chang Wanquan in August 2013, the latter clearly expressed that the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China is not going to give up its maritime territorial 
disputes. Beijing does not intend to renounce its claims to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu, Spratly and Paracel Islands. The intersecting claims to these is-
lands by many East Asian states became one of the reasons for the  in-
tensification of political tensions in the whole region. Since 2010 more 
and more U.S. government thoroughly avoided any declarations regarding 
the disputes that could enrage China, the growing number of incidents, 
the more assertive Chinesepolicy and the pressure from regional allies has 
finally made Washington much less reserved than it used to be in the past. 
Since 2010, U.S. diplomats and government officials have repeatedly ex-
pressed their support for Japan, the Philippines and even Vietnam in their 
territorial disputes with their much bigger neighbor (‘ChRL ostrzega USA’, 
2013). Interestingly, since approximately 2011, a new tone has emerged 
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in the U.S. diplomatic rhetoric concerning China. As in the past, U.S. 
politicians like to scold China for violating human rights, turning a blind 
eye to intellectual-property piracy, unfair trade practices, spying activi-
ties, and so on and so forth. However, lately a new “thread” has emerged 
in their criticism of the  Middle Kingdom. Namely, the  U.S. diplomats 
have begun to criticize Mainland China for their excessive claims of mari-
time sovereignty and for their aggressive steps against smaller and weaker 
neighbors on disputed bodies of water. For example, during her speech in 
November 2011 in Hawaii, the now former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton criticized the Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea 
(Johnson, 2011). It is true that the U.S. diplomats still try to pretend to 
be neutral towards the East Asia maritime territorial disputes, yet as Mi-
chael T. Klare (Klare, 2013) accurately noticed in his article published in 
“The Foreign Affairs” website: Washington's stance is less neutral than it 
appears and more geared toward violent conflict than talking it out. He 
points out that … while continuing to profess neutrality, [U.S.] senior 
officials have expressed dismay over the aggressive actions taken by cer-
tain unnamed claimants – easily interpreted as meaning China. Indeed, 
a careful observer of the rhetoric used by U.S. diplomats could only agree 
with this opinion. Therefore, it should not be a surprise for anybody, that 
neither China, nor its opponents in disputes over contested islands treat 
the United States as a neutral player. Definitely, the United States is not 
a neutral, disinterested party in this dispute. Thus this, to a certain extent, 
is a result of various incidents on the disputed waters that usually, how-
ever not always, were provoked by Beijing. Washington supports, though 
usually subtly and indirectly, its East Asian partners in their maritime dis-
putes with Mainland China. There are many more signs of Obama’s tilt 
to Asia. For instance, in non-military fields the U.S. President took a deci-
sion to make his state a member of the East Asia Summit and consequent-
ly is opting for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Moreover, within its general and 
broad aim of containing China, Washington is even reaching out outside 
the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. intends to deepen its relationship with 
India who is treated among the  foreign policy elites in Washington as 
a potential counterweight to China. On top of that, the U.S. has even 
reached out to Vietnam, a communist dictatorship and former U.S. ene-
my, as well as Myanmar, another dictatorship closely connected to China. 
Indonesia has been playing a growing role in U.S. foreign policy in recent 
years. Since 2010, when Obama made a decision to lift a ban on U.S. 
military contacts with the Indonesian Kopassus Special Forces, relations 
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between Jakarta and Washington have improved substantially. The  ar-
mies, navies and air forces of both states have since begun joint maneu-
vers and exercises, for instance Garuda Shield in 2011. The governments 
of both countries are interested in further progress in bilateral security 
relations. The  Indonesian episode in Obama’s biography is another fa-
vorable factor for tightening ties between these two states.
Conclusions
In the  future the  People’s Liberation Army will only become more 
powerful than it is today. It is reasonable to assume that the technological 
gap between the American and Chinese militaries will diminish gradu-
ally and not deepen in the  coming years. The  intensive and successful 
industrial espionage on the  part of the  PRC provides an additional ar-
gument in support of this claim. Furthermore, the  less indebted China 
could probably let itself spend more money on defense than the heavily 
indebted United States. American policymakers and military personnel 
realize these trends well. That is why Americans persist in their efforts to 
at least inhibit these undesirable (from their viewpoint) processes. In turn, 
the Chinese on their part endeavor to maximize the cost and risk of U.S. 
power projection in the Western Pacific and Eastern Asia, in particular in 
the waters off their motherland.
Obviously, Beijing does not welcome the  U.S. Pivot to Asia. On 
the contrary, Chinese leaders see it as the next step of a U.S. policy aimed 
at containing China. The  military dimension of this renewed Ameri-
can focus on Asia-Pacific especially worries Chinese leaders. Nonethe-
less, regardless of the  opinions and fears of Beijing, the  United States 
government will persevere in its pivot to the Asia-Pacific. The mere fact 
that that the  Trans-Pacific trade currently accounts for over two-thirds 
of total containerized shipping for the  U.S. reveals enough. The  next 
President of the United States will most likely continue the Asia-Pacific 
policy that the Obama administration has begun. Additionally, in all like-
lihood the existing contentious issues between the  two powers such as 
cyber spying or the difference of opinions as to the territorial affiliation of 
the Spratly, Paracel and Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands will not vanish anytime 
soon. Yet, despite of some (unavoidable) tensions in U.S.-China relations, 
both Beijing and Washington have been working hard and successfully not 
to let the disputes get out of control.
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